We look at the consequences of allowing public health insurance (PuHI) to be voluntary when its coverage can be supplemented in the market. PuHI redistributes with respect to risk and income, and the market is affected by adverse selection. We argue that making PuHI voluntary does not lead to its collapse since there are always individuals participating in it. Additionally, in some cases, a voluntary PuHI scheme creates an increase in market efficiency because participation in it becomes a sign of an individual's type. The welfare consequences depend on the status quo. If in the status quo there is no political support for a compulsory PuHI, making it voluntary constitutes a Pareto improvement, and in some cases all individuals are strictly better off. If, instead, the status quo implements compulsory PuHI, making it voluntary then results in less redistribution.
Introduction
Many health care systems rely on health insurance as a form of financing health care. Health insurance may be public, if financed through general taxation and/or social security contributions, or private, if financed through private non-income related premiums. Therefore, most often, public health insurance involves redistribution across income and risk levels, which is not the case for private health insurance. Both types of insurance also diverge in terms of their degree of obligation. Public health insurance is usually mandatory, whereas in most OECD countries individuals may choose whether or not they want to insure privately, but the opposite may exist as well. Additionally, some countries mandate the purchase of health insurance irrespective of its nature, while others allow individuals to choose whether or not they wish to be insured against health accidents.
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It is often claimed the unfeasibility of a voluntary yet redistributive PuHI scheme co-existing with a voluntary private health insurance (PHI) market. If individuals were given the option to opt out of PuHI, those contributing to its redistribution would leave and join the PHI market.
The result would be that no one would be willing to participate in public insurance.
Whilst in reality most PuHI schemes are indeed compulsory, there nevertheless exist some examples of voluntary schemes, such as, for example, the Chilean reform of the 1980s, the programs of some US states prior to the Affordable Care Act, and the schemes for the selfemployed in Europe. These cases of voluntary PuHI (discussed in more detail in Section 1) naturally ask the question as to how their existence can be theoretically justified.
In this paper we explicitly analyze the coexistence of a voluntary and redistributive PuHI scheme whose coverage can be supplemented by the market.
2 As in many countries we assume that PuHI pools risk and is financed by payroll taxes. Additionally, public coverage is decided by majority voting. On the other hand, the PHI market is competitive, discriminates in risk and is affected by adverse selection, thus offering incomplete coverage to low-risk individuals (see Cawley and Philipson 1999 , Cutler and Zeckhauser 1997 , and Finkelstein and Poterba 2004 for empirical tests of adverse selection in health-related insurance markets). Adverse selection is indeed an example often cited of market failure that a mandatory public scheme can overcome (Arrow 1963 , Johnson 1977 . We instead focus on the implications of a voluntary PuHI scheme for coverage available in both the public and private sectors.
Our paper arguably makes a number of important contributions to the relevant literature.
Firstly, we provide an analytical framework for the study of voluntary PuHI and show that its existence is theoretically guaranteed since there are always individuals willing to participate in it. Other authors have already looked at the interactions between the public and private provision of health insurance, although they have always assumed a public mandatory scheme (see Epple and Romano 1996 , Gouveia 1997 , Breyer 2001 , and De Donder and Hindriks 2003 .
Secondly, we realize that the change in nature of the public policy has implications not only for itself but also for the private market. Golosov and Tsyvinski 2007 and Chetty and Saez 2010 show that the welfare gains of PuHI are smaller when markets respond endogenously, thereby 2 Our analysis could easily be extended to other sorts of public insurance as insurance against income loss due to disability or unemployment.
stressing that markets should not be taken as given. Our contribution is in the same vein.
More precisely, we demonstrate that in some cases a voluntary PuHI scheme can increase the efficiency of the PHI market. In this respect Sapelli and Vial 2003 find evidence of self-selection against Chilean public insurance. However, what has not yet been asserted in the literature is the market use of this information, implying an increase in private coverage when compared to the exclusive PHI system. Thirdly, we draw conclusions about the welfare implications of reforming PuHI into a voluntary scheme. In our setup, the status quo can be a society with either some level of compulsory PuHI or no PuHI at all. In the former case, PHI market coverage is increased at the cost of less redistribution. In the latter case there is room for a Pareto improvement: private coverage may be increased to the benefit of more redistribution.
Finally, in our setup public coverage is decided by majority voting and thus we are able to illustrate how the non-separability of preferences, with respect to public and private provision of insurance, affects the political outcome. While this mechanism has already been noted for the top-up of compulsory public insurance, 3 we now present evidence for the top-up of voluntary PuHI. The political consequence is that there is no opposition to voluntary public coverage.
This point has already been raised by Congleton 2007 who uses voluntarism to explain why individuals with different insurance needs adopt, and politically support, states with different PuHI schemes. In our setup, voluntarism allows individuals to signal their type and therefore get a higher coverage in the market. Consequently, a voluntary PuHI scheme not only never collapses but, furthermore, has stronger political support than a compulsory scheme.
Our paper is set out as follows. 
The Setup
The economy is composed of individuals, insurance companies, and the government. Individuals choose the level of public coverage through majority voting, whether or not to participate in PuHI, and which (if any) PHI contract to buy. Insurance companies offer insurance contracts.
Lastly, the government sets the public premium so that the budget is balanced in expected terms and implements the PuHI coverage elected. Each agents' role is discussed in detail in Section 3.
Individuals face two states of nature. They can be in good health or incur the same health damage d, with d = 1. Individuals differ both in terms of their income and probability of incurring the health damage. There are two levels of risk {θ L , θ H } and two levels of income {w L , w H }, with 0 < θ L < θ H < 1 and 1 < w L < w H < ∞.
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The set The information structure is as follows. Individuals, insurance companies and the government know the distribution of types in the economy (λ ij ), and individuals' incomes are verifiable. 7 However individual probabilities of accident are private information, neither observed by insurance companies nor the government, leading to adverse selection in the PHI market, as shown in Section 3.3.
Individuals are risk averse, and we model their utility using Yaari 1987's Dual Theory (DT).
For Expected Utility (EU) the attitude towards risk is modelled with a transformation of wealth (keeping linearity in probabilities), whereas under DT it is by means of a transformation of 6 As we want to focus specifically on the interactions of the public and the private sector as insurers, we assume exogenous labor supply and abstract from the discussion the relevance of health insurance when taxation is available. Blomqvist and Horn 1984 , Rochet 1991 , and Cremer and Pestieau 1996 have studied this problem and conclude that health insurance can improve upon taxation since it does not have an associated deadweight loss (in the absence of moral hazard) as does income taxation. Conversely, Breyer and Haufler 2000 argue in favor of leaving income redistribution to the tax system with a view to creating efficient insurance.
7 This assumption enables us to design social contributions proportional to individuals' income and does not bring implications to the insurance market.
probabilities (keeping linearity in wealth). Risk aversion is represented by magnifying the perceived risk of bad outcomes.
For analytical tractability we adopt DT instead of EU.
8 Under DT the utility of an uninsured individual with income w j , facing the loss of d = 1 with probability θ i can be represented by:
where φ(θ i ) > θ i in order to capture individuals' risk aversion. De Donder and Hindriks 2003
where α denotes the degree of risk aversion, the same for all individuals. Assuming α to be independent of w, the authors are thus able to dissociate attitude towards risk from the marginal value of wealth, which simplifies the analysis greatly. The utility of an individual without insurance is thus:
Individuals pay the premium π in both states of nature, and in the bad state of nature they receive a benefit proportional to their loss: the insurance coverage δ, with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. PHI and PuHI differ with respect to both coverage and premium in the terms detailed in the next section.
For the time being it should be noted that any insurance contract {π, δ} affects individuals' utility in the following way:
While we will discuss this point in detail in Section 3.4, it can already be noted that due to DT individuals have corner preferences with respect to δ. Finally, we use the superscript u to distinguish PuHI {π u , δ u } from a PHI contract {π, δ}, and use the shortcut V ij (·) for V (·; θ i , w j ).
8 It is beyond the scope of this paper to contribute to the discussion as to which theory is most suitable to represent individuals' preferences under uncertainty. We refer the reader to Appendix 6.1 where DT is briefly presented. Also, it is of interest to look at Machina 2000 who test the robustness of EU exploring a non-expected utility general analysis, and Doherty and Eeckhoudt 1995, who compare EU with DT in particular, and stress that insurance is never a Giffen good under DT, in contrast to EU.
The Timing
We next analyze the timing of decisions in four stages. In stage 1 individuals vote on the level of public coverage δ u that provides them with the highest utility (see e.g. Caplan 2007 for a departure from rationality and, in particular, the introduction of voters' misconceptions and irrational beliefs). They take as given the structure of social contributions which increase with income. Implicitly we are assuming that the redistributive role of PuHI is not questioned but that individuals have a political say on the level of public coverage. This assumption can be justified by noting that while the level of public coverage is more often subject to political discussion and changes, the redistributive degree of PuHI is decided at earlier stages, often referred to as the constitutional stage, and once implemented is costly to change.
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We consider only a simple majority voting rule. We do not discuss which type of political model best mimics the political choice of public coverage and simply focus on the political support for a given level of PuHI. Our choice is mainly driven by the fact that under DT individuals have corner preferences with respect to δ u . Consequently our results hold for other models of political decision as, for example, an indirect voting ruled by two parties.
Knowing the level of public coverage elected at stage 1, in stage 2 insurance companies compete in the offering of insurance contracts. This timing assumes that the market adjusts to the elected value of public coverage. Unlike PuHI, PHI discriminates on risk. Indeed, since an individual's probability of accident is private information, adverse selection arises. Therefore the contract intended for low-risk individuals is of incomplete coverage in order to prevent highrisk individuals from buying it (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) . The novelty of our approach is the market use of the information concerning participation in PuHI that minimizes the adverse selection problem. We find that the market coverage of low-risk individuals does not need to be reduced as much as when compared to the one arising under an exclusive private system.
In stage 3 individuals choose simultaneously whether or not to participate in PuHI and which private contract to buy, knowing the level of public coverage and private contracts. These are simultaneous decisions because contracts may be conditional on participation in PuHI. We assume that similar individuals act as a group and take a single decision as regards participation in PuHI and the market, given others' optimal participation choices. Also, we assume that type (θ i , w j ) individuals realize the effect of their participation on the public pool of risks and incomes. For future reference, let the indicator p ij take the value one if (θ i , w j ) individuals decide to participate in PuHI, and zero otherwise. Additionally, let p = (p LL , p LH , p HL , p HH )
represent the vector of all individuals' decisions.
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Stage 4 is a verification stage. At this stage δ u elected in stage 1 and participation in PuHI, vector p of stage 3, are observable. Therefore the government is able to charge contributions to those participating in PuHI and thus implement the public policy. Additionally, the market is able to sell contracts conditional on individuals' participation in PuHI.
We adopt the equilibrium concept of subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium. Thus, we now solve the problem from the last stage to the first.
Stage 4: Implementation of PuHI and market contracts
We emphasize that this is simply a verification stage. PHI contracts are sold conditional on individuals' choices with respect to participation in PuHI, which is observable at this stage.
Additionally, the government implements the public policy. It charges social contributions paid in both states of nature to those individuals participating in PuHI. In exchange they are entitled to the insurance coverage δ u (p) in case of health damage, as elected at stage 1.
As in most real world systems, we assume PuHI to be financed by payroll taxes (see Casamatta et al. 2000, and De Donder and Hindriks 2003, among others) . The premium is thus proportional to individuals' income and not related to individual risk. The public policy {π u , δ u } satisfies the budget balance rule such that the social contributions equal expected payout. The social contribution of an individual with income w j is given by:
with w µ|p being the mean income of those participating in PuHI, i.e., conditional on the choices 10 A group of similar individuals can be viewed as a union in which individuals sharing the same characteristics act as a unit. Alternatively, we could assume that decisions are taken individually. Depending on the parameters of the model, under this assumption we also expect equilibria in which all similar individuals choose the same action. In order to support our argument, we would focus on such symmetric equilibria. This is the reason why, for ease of understanding, that we prefer to focus from the beginning on the decision process of a unit of similar individuals.
of participation given by
is the mean income conditional on all individuals participating in PuHI except low-risk-highincome ones. The same applies to θ µ|p . Unconditional risk and income means are denoted by, respectively, θ µ and w µ .
Besides the inherent insurance redistribution from those in the good state of nature to those in the bad state, PuHI redistributes with respect to both income and risk. It redistributes with respect to income because the rich pay more than the poor whereas coverage is uniform. It redistributes with respect to risk, because social contributions do not depend on risk and highrisk individuals receive the insurance benefit more often (θ H of the times) than low-risk ones (only θ L of the times). Obviously, redistribution occurs only among participants in PuHI.
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At previous stages, individuals anticipate the structure of social contributions as given by (4), and that the public policy is implemented and private contracts are sold, conditional on their decision to participate in PuHI.
Stage 3: Participation in PuHI and in the market
At stage 3 the four groups decide, simultaneously, whether or not to participate in PuHI and the PHI market. Participating in PuHI means that they can supplement it on the market.
Opting out of PuHI means relying solely on private coverage.
The private contracts are as follows. In exchange for a premium π, insurance companies offer the coverage δ − δ u (p)p ij , where δ represents total coverage from which public coverage δ u is deducted for those individuals who benefit from it, i.e., indicator p ij = 1 (otherwise p ij = 0).
individual is: 
Hence, taking the public policy and the contracts as given, individuals choose the combination of whether to participate in PuHI p ij and the private contract {π ij , δ ij − δ u (p)p ij } that delivers them more utility and satisfies the rationality constraint (RC). They solve the problem:
where π u j (p) is given by (4) and the two zeros on the RHS of the RC mean the non-purchasing of PHI. Insurance companies anticipate this behavior at Stage 2. The maximum premium an individual is willing to pay, the reservation premium, is defined when (RC) is binding:
The reservation premium is thus π
the product among private coverage and (1 + α)θ i , i.e., above the actuarially fair premium, as given by (6). Hence, any risk averse individual (α > 0) is willing to buy insurance above the actuarially fair premium.
When evaluating whether or not to participate in PuHI, a group of similar individuals takes as given the others' optimal choices. It incorporates the effect of its own choice on the public premium, because it changes the pooling of incomes and risks of the population covered by PuHI, respectively w µ|p and θ µ|p in (4), and on the public coverage elected in stage 1.
Moreover, it also affects the structure of private contracts, as shown in Section 3.3. With these assumptions in mind, we present the definition of the Nash equilibrium of groups' simultaneous decision regarding participation in PuHI. 
Otherwise, group type (θ i , w j ) instead chooses 1 − p * ij and the Nash equilibrium isp ij .
Given other groups' choices, (θ i , w j ) group considers participating in PuHI acknowledging that the public policy and the private contract adjust to the vector of decisions p * . 12 Assume that (θ i , w j ) group decides to participate in PuHI, i.e. p * ij = 1. Therefore, it must be the case that they are better off than if they did not participate, given other groups' choices. Condition (7) can be written as
where we can substitute π u j (p * ), given by (4), and the actuarially fair premia π ij (p * ) and π ij (p ij )
as defined by (6). Considering the specific case of low-risk individuals, (7) is further reduced to (8) below:
given δ Lj (p * ) and δ Lj (p Lj ) defined at stage 2. In order to interpret (8) consider that individuals are risk neutral (α = 0). They decide to participate in PuHI if their relative risk, defined as the ratio of their own risk to the mean risk of the participants in PuHI, is higher than their relative income, defined analogously. PuHI is thus attractive to low-risk individuals if what they lose from risk redistribution is less than what they gain from income redistribution. However, since individuals are risk averse (α > 0) and are affected by incomplete coverage in the PHI market, even low-risk-high-income individuals may be willing to participate in PuHI. Indeed, besides redistribution, the (potential) difference in total coverage arising from participating in PuHI also plays a role in individuals' decisions. Additionally, the greater α, the bigger this term.
As regards the decision of high-risk individuals, an analogous condition is found. Nevertheless, we can already incorporate the presumption that in stage 2 the market is offering full coverage to high-risk individuals, regardless of their participation in PuHI, i.e., δ Hj (p * ) = δ Hj (p Hj ) = 1 (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 separating equilibrium). Condition (7) becomes:
Since they are fully insured, what matters to high-risk individuals is whether what they gain in risk redistribution is greater than what they may lose in income redistribution. We can already state that high-risk-low-income individuals are always willing to participate in PuHI because they are always above the average risk and always below the average income of those participating in PuHI.
For future reference, if instead one considers p * ij = 0 then the analogous conditions to (8) and (9) for low-and high-risk individuals not be willing to participate in PuHI are, respectively:
With two risk and two income levels, and each of the four groups with two possible actions,
i.e., to participate in or to opt out of PuHI, there are then 16 combinations of groups' decisions as regards participation in PuHI, given δ u ∈ [0, 1] elected at stage 1. Yet, not all these 16
combinations are equilibria satisfying Definition 1. For example, it is not possible to have highrisk-low-income individuals opting out of PuHI since they always benefit from risk and income redistribution. In other words, (11) never holds for (θ H , w L ) individuals. Moreover, some of the Nash equilibria of this subgame never arise as an outcome of the game because they are not on the equilibrium. For instance, some combinations at stage 3 would only arise for insurance contracts that are never offered in equilibrium at stage 2. For this reason, we postpone to stage 2 the characterization of the equilibria of the subgame of stage 3. Still, one example to be used in the following is case 1, in which low-risk-high-income individuals opt out and all the others participate in PuHI, i.e., p * = p 1 ≡ (1, 0, 1, 1). For future reference the necessary conditions for case 1 to be an equilibrium are presented. These are just the case-specific conditions (8)-(11).
Stage 2: The market designs menus of insurance contracts
At this stage insurance companies design insurance contracts. The basic assumptions are that the insurance market is competitive, individuals can buy at most one PHI contract and risk is not observable.
To illustrate the role of information regarding participation in public health insurance in the design of PHI contracts and, in particular, how it affects the coverage offered, we focus on case 1. Case 1, with p = p 1 ≡ (1, 0, 1, 1), illustrates how p ij is informative. Since only low-risk-highincome individuals opt out of PuHI, the market can use this information to improve contracts.
We contrast private contracts offered in the exclusive private solution to those offered in case 1 and conclude that private coverage offered to (θ L , w H ) individuals is greater in case 1.
In case 1 when the market observes p ij = 1 it faces the same problem as in an exclusive private system. Indeed insurance companies are not able to distinguish types since both lowand high-risk individuals participate in PuHI. Following Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, contracts are designed so that θ H individuals are at least as well off with the contract {π Hj , δ Hj −δ u } than with the contract intended for (θ L , w L ) individuals, {π LL , δ LL −δ u }, conditional on participation in PuHI. Incentive compatibility implies:
We solve the (binding) incentive problem for δ LL , substituting π Hj and π LL as given by (6), imposing no distortion at the top of total coverage, i.e., δ Hj = 1, and noting that the public premium π u j , as defined by (4) 
, or equivalently,
Private coverage is obtained by deducting δ u from total coverage δ * ij and is offered at the actuarially fair premium. The two private contracts offered to participants in PuHI are:
These contracts satisfy the rationality constraints and are thus actually purchased, as seen at stage 3. 14 Total coverage increases in δ u , private coverage is always non-negative for δ u ≤ 1, and PHI is partially crowded out by PuHI (see Eckstein et al.
1985, Cutler and Gruber 1996, De Donder and Hindriks 2003, and Gruber and Simon 2008, among others)
. Also, the coverage rate is increasing in risk aversion (α) and in the risk level.
The equilibrium coverage rates (17) and (18) In this respect note that opting out of PuHI in case 1 becomes a perfect signal of being a lowrisk-high-income individual, and the market can use this information. The contract intended for (θ L , w H ) individuals must be incentive compatible so that all other groups prefer to participate in PuHI rather than opting out of PuHI, and to purchase the contract {π LH (p 1 ), δ LH (p 1 )} intended for (θ L , w H ) individuals. Note how this differs from guaranteeing that high-risk individuals prefer to top up public coverage with the contract intended for them, rather than with 13 It should be made clear that despite individuals being characterized by two dimensions, screening takes place only over the probability of illness. Moreover, separation occurs with respect to total coverage, and not only private, because it is only effective if it takes into consideration the effect of total insurance on the individual's utility.
14 The pair of contracts
} is undominated by other pair of separating contracts, in the sense that there is no other contract attractive to only one of the types inducing non-negative profits. Yet, as Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 have shown, a separating equilibrium does not always exist, in which case there is no equilibrium in the competitive market. In what follows we assume that the share of high-risk individuals is high enough so that there is no profitable pooling insurance contract attractive to both high and low-risk individuals.
the contract intended for (θ L , w L ) individuals. Or, as in an exclusive private system, from guaranteeing that high-risk individuals prefer the contract intended for them, rather than the one intended for low-risk individuals. In point of fact, the contract intended for (θ L , w H ) individuals must satisfy a looser incentive compatibility constraint (IC) because high-risk individuals compare supplementing PuHI with relying solely on such private contract. Finally, note that given p * = p 1 , high-risk-high-income individuals are the first high-risk group willing to opt out of PuHI because they contribute to income redistribution, while high-risk-low-income individuals benefit from it. In the insurance company problem, the IC (16) is replaced by:
Solving the binding IC for δ LH (p 1 ) with π u H (p 1 ) given by (4), the actuarially fair premia π HH (p 1 ) and π LH (p 1 ) given by (6), and using δ * HH (p 1 ) = 1 one finds the equilibrium total coverage rate: To summarize, if case 1 is anticipated, the market offers three contracts at an actuarially fair
for low-risk-low-income individuals; and (iii ){π *
for low-risk-high-income individuals opting out of PuHI.
Having illustrated the increase in market coverage in case 1, we now characterize in Proposition 2 all the equilibria that can emerge at the stage 2 subgame. We then provide a numerical illustration of such equilibria.
Proposition 2 Given δ u (p) ∈ [0, 1] elected at stage 1 and the actuarially fair premium as defined by (6), the potential equilibria that can emerge at stage 2 subgame for i, j = {L, H} are:
• The market offers the three actuarially fair contracts with premium given by (6):
by (18); • The market offers the four actuarially fair contracts:
; and the equilibrium of stage 3 is case 2 where high income individuals opt out, i.e.,
• The market offers the three actuarially fair contracts:
and the equilibrium of stage 3 is case 3 where only (θ L , w L ) individuals participate in PuHI, i.e., p * = p 3 ≡ (1, 0, 0, 0);
• The market offers the two actuarially fair contracts {π *
, and the equilibrium of stage 3 is case 4 with all participating in PuHI, i.e., p * = p 4 ≡ (1, 1, 1, 1).
Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
The parameters of the economy determine which equilibrium emerges. Low risk aversion makes equilibria in which low-risk individuals participate in PuHI less likely. For example, if α > 0.34 cases 1-4 can arise in equilibrium but when it takes the value 0.34 only cases 2-3 can arise. Note as well that for α < 0.33 (not reported on the table) only case 3 arises in equilibrium. Finally, all the simulations undertaken suggest that the four cases are mutually exclusive and there is an episode of no-equilibrium.
In all possible cases of Proposition 2 PuHI redistributes with respect to risk and/or income, except in case 3. Yet, it should be noted how different case 3 is from the case in which all individuals decide to opt out, which indeed cannot arise in equilibrium (see Appendix 6.3).
The intuition is that with no one participating in PuHI, both low-risk individuals would find it profitable to unilaterally deviate towards participation with a view to signaling their type and increase their market coverage. Therefore, a very important corollary that emerges from the above proposition is that it cannot happen that all individuals decide to opt out of PuHI:
Corollary 1 If PuHI is voluntary, there are always individuals participating in it.
Stage 1: Political equilibrium
Finally, we consider the political process. At stage 1 individuals vote for their most preferred level of public coverage δ u (p). The implemented level of public coverage is the one most voted for, obeying a simple majority rule. As individuals vote anticipating the outcomes of subsequent stages, their vote may change according to the equilibrium anticipated at the subgame of stage 2. For ease of presentation we focus first on case 1.
Considering case 1, we must distinguish the preferences of those participating in PuHI from the preferences of (θ L , w H ) individuals who opt out. Starting with those participating in PuHI, their preferred level of public coverage is the value δ u (p 1 ) that maximizes:
Substituting π u j (p 1 ), the actuarially fair premium π ij (p 1 ), and δ * ij (p 1 ) given by, respectively, (4), (6), and (19) into the indirect utility function one obtains:
Differentiating (23) with respect to δ u (p 1 ) one gets the (θ i , w j ) individuals' most preferred level for public coverage. Given that DT implies linear preferences over δ u their most preferred value is either zero or one (De Donder and Hindriks 2003) . Indeed, (θ i , w j ) individuals vote for
Condition (24) is implied by (12), (14), and (15), necessary conditions for case 1 to be an equilibrium. Therefore (24) is always satisfied in case 1 and (θ L , w L ), (θ H , w L ), and (θ H , w H ) individuals vote for δ u (p 1 ) = 1.
As regards low-risk-high-income individuals who opt out, they vote for the value δ u (p 1 ) that maximizes 
Welfare Analysis
We now investigate the impact of the mandatory and voluntary schemes on each group's welfare.
To this end we contrast the two outcomes that may arise under a mandatory scheme δ u = 1 and δ u = 0, with the four possible cases of a voluntary scheme.
Suppose that in a compulsory scheme there is no political support for PuHI and thus δ u = 0 is elected. In this case, PuHI is politically feasible only if it is voluntary. Additionally no one would be worse off in any of the cases that may arise under a voluntary scheme. Indeed, those individuals relying solely on the (same) private coverage would be indifferent. The others would be better off if they benefited from income or risk redistribution in PuHI (because of a lower premium paid), and/or because private coverage increased (as in case 1 for (θ L , w H ) individuals).
Hence reforming an exclusive PHI system, i.e., a compulsory δ u = 0, into a voluntary PuHI scheme constitutes a Pareto improvement. This may serve to illustrate the emergence of the US state voluntary programs discussed in Section 2. Proposition 4 summarizes these results. 
Conclusion
We provide a foundation for the sustainability of voluntary public health insurance (PuHI) schemes, which redistributes both in the risk and income dimensions, when the competitive private health insurance (PHI) market is affected by adverse selection. Additionally we contrast the welfare implications of the voluntary and compulsory schemes.
Several robustness analyses can be made. The first concerns Dual Theory (DT). The advantage of DT is that we are able to isolate the low-risk individuals' signalization mechanism, which leads to an increase of their market coverage. However, on the other hand, DT implies corner solutions with respect to insurance coverage. Although it may make matters more complex, it seems worthwhile trying to model individuals' preferences using Expected Utility (EU).
The second relates to enriching the analysis by considering other important aspects of the health system such as moral hazard (Arrow 1963) , propitious selection (Hemenway 1990) or labor market effects (Buchmueller and Valletta 1996) . Note that in a context of moral hazard incomplete coverage is seen as a means of increasing efficiency. Therefore it is difficult to estimate the implications of introducing moral hazard into the analysis.
Another obvious analytical extension is to consider a continuum of individuals. This would simplify the empirical testing of our predictions and facilitate the calibration of the model. In this respect, the study by Sapelli and Vial 2003 constitutes an important step in the empirical analysis of the Chilean reform. Their work could be developed to test the prediction of Proposition 1. We should find that the market menu of contracts after reform offers more coverage, understood as higher expenditures insured, to low-risk individuals. The same test could be done before and after the introduction of the US state voluntary health insurance programs.
Finally, voluntary solutions are of particular interest in developing countries, where tax systems are often more deficient, compromising compulsory public schemes, and where a major part of the (poor) population is often excluded from the market (see Pauly et al. 2006) . Case 2, high-income individuals opting out and low-income ones participating in PuHI, with p * = p 2 ≡ (1, 0, 1, 0) . The following conditions must hold simultaneously (case-specific conditions (8)- (11)):
Note that δ Hj (p 2 ) = 1. The contract {π LL , δ LL }, intended for (θ L , w L ) individuals, is offered conditional on participation in PuHI. Incentive compatibility implies that δ LL is low enough to deter (θ H , w L ) individuals to top up PuHI with δ LL , and to deter (θ H , w H ) individuals from participating in PuHI and topping it up with δ LL . In the PHI company's problem the IC (16) is replaced by the following ICs:
Substituting π HL , π HH , and π LL as given by (6), imposing δ Hj = 1, and noting that π u L and π u H are defined by (4), (29) and (30) respectively give the following upper bounds for δ LL :
Note that (31) is active whereas (32) The following conditions must hold simultaneously: 
As before, δ Hj (p 3 ) = 1. The contract intended for low-risk individual is conditional on non-participation in PuHI. The two following IC constraints of (θ H , w L ) and (θ H , w H ) individuals respectively are: 
PHI contracts are offered conditional on participation in PuHI. Incentive compatibility implies:
. (43) Proceeding analogously we get the following equilibrium coverage rate: δ *
. Case 5 -(θ H , w H ) opting out and all others participating in PuHI: p * = p 5 ≡ (1, 1, 1, 0). The following conditions must hold simultaneously:
The contract intended for low-risk individuals is conditional on participation in PuHI and satisfies the following IC constraints: Table 1 : Numerical illustration of possible equilibria. In this example θ H = 0.5, w L = 1, λ LL = 0.25, λ HL = 0.25, and 0.34 ≤ α ≤ 1. Increments of all other variables of 0.1 except for λ LH which we have applied increments of 0.05. The share of high-risk-high-income individuals is the remaining share 1−(λ LL +λ LH +λ HL ).
